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The “Vietnam Legion”
West German Psychological Warfare against
East German Propaganda in the 1960s
✣ Peter Busch
On Saturday, 4 September 1965, the editors of Neues Deutsch-
land, the ofªcial newspaper of East Germany’s Socialist Unity Party (SED),
presented “sensational revelations” to their readers. On the ªrst page, under
the customary ªve-pointed star surrounding the portrait of Karl Marx, the
main headline featured a story on Southeast Asia. “Bundeswehr takes part in
aggression in Vietnam,” it read. The paper went on to reveal “facts” that sup-
posedly conªrmed the suspicions voiced by leaders of the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR) for some time. Ofªcers of the West German air force,
Neues Deutschland claimed, were ºying “terror attacks against Vietnam’s peo-
ple.” Some 120 soldiers from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were
ªghting side by side with the “American aggressors,” and in the process six
had died, thirteen had been wounded, and two had gone missing. These
“facts,” the story claimed, had been unearthed by the U.S. weekly news-
magazine Time, the Associated Press news agency, and a small West German
newspaper with close links to Communists, Bauernruf, which had allegedly
learned about it from a mother whose son had taken part in the mission.
Neues Deutschland noted that when the West German government was con-
fronted about the matter, a spokesman “denied the involvement of West Ger-
man soldiers in the dirty war in Vietnam.”1
East German radio had broken this purported story in its evening news
of the previous day but had not made it the lead. Pride of place had gone to a
visit by the SED General Secretary, Walter Ulbricht, to the city of Neubran-
1. “Bundeswehr ist an Aggression in Vietnam beteiligt,” Neues Deutschland, 4 September 1965, p. 1.
The small West German newspaper Bauernruf was published in Düsseldorf and was closely connected
to West German Communist circles.
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denburg. Yet when the 9:00 PM news got around to the Vietnam story, it
used the phrase that framed GDR media coverage of alleged Bundeswehr par-
ticipation in Vietnam from then on. The West German government, the news
program reported, had established a “Vietnam Legion.” The 120 members of
the legion had allegedly been given U.S. passports and were ºying American
aircraft in Vietnam.2 The following day GDR radio maintained that the West
German denial was just another of Bonn’s lies. The East Germans added a
new accusation to the litany: Bonn was supplying the Saigon regime with poi-
son gas.3 East German media also claimed that none other than General Heinz
Trettner, the Bundeswehr chief of staff, was in charge of the “Vietnam Legion.”
Neues Deutschland stressed that the legion was modeled on the “Condor Le-
gion” that had been sent by Nazi Germany to support the Fascists in the Span-
ish Civil War. Trettner, who at a young age had served in Adolf Hitler’s air force,
was supposedly playing a leading role in the “Condor Legion.”4
The mounting volume of GDR media stories alleging FRG involvement
in Vietnam did not go unnoticed in Bonn. The psychological warfare section
in the FRG Ministry of Defense had been closely monitoring GDR coverage
of purported Bundeswehr activities in Vietnam since June 1965.5 When
Neues Deutschland, the main East German wire service, and GDR radio
started to use the label “Vietnam Legion” and attacked General Trettner, West
Germany’s psychological warfare experts swung into action. They embarked
on an extensive campaign to expose GDR propaganda methods and prove
that East German allegations were completely unfounded.6
One purpose of this article is to draw attention to the activities of the
Bundeswehr’s psychological warfare section, which has so far received scant
scholarly attention even in Germany. A recent doctoral dissertation is the
most detailed study to date, but it focuses on the section’s role in funding edu-
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2. 21.00h news bulletin, GDR Radio I, 3 September 1965, in Imperial War Museum, Duxford, BBC
Monitoring Transcript Collection, Box EE/C/53: Eastern Germany, Folder: Voice 29.8.–4.9.1965.
3. “Radio Magazine on West German Bundeswehr,” GDR Radio I, 4 September 1965, 17.10h, Impe-
rial War Museum, Duxford, BBC Monitoring Transcript Collection, Box EE/C/53: Eastern Germany,
Folder: Voice 29.8.–4.9.1965.
4. “Erhard stellt Legion Vietnam auf,” Neues Deutschland, 6 September 1965, p. 1.
5. The FRG Ministry of Defense named the section PSK im Frieden (Psychological Warfare in Peace
Time).
6. Minute to minister (Ministervorlage), 14 January 1966, in Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Freiburg
(BMA-F), BW/2/5112. At the time, the terms “propaganda” and “psychological warfare” were used
interchangeably. A useful, stripped-down deªnition of “propaganda” has been suggested by Philip
Taylor, who calls it a “deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way.”
Philip Taylor, Munitions of the Mind—A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present
Era (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 6. For a brief yet excellent discussion of
“propaganda history,” see Kenneth A. Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at
Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), pp. 15–37.
cational societies in West Germany.7 Karl Heinz Roth’s Invasionsziel DDR of
1971 reveals interesting insights into the organization, but the book is marred
by Roth’s strident anti-Bundeswehr stance.8 More recently, Dirk Schindelbeck
made use of some of the available primary records, and Friedrich-Wilhelm
Schlomann drew on his experience as a member of the psychological warfare
section in the 1960s to discuss some of its work.9 Schlomann stresses that
FRG Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauß set up the psychological warfare
section in 1958 to “immunize” the West German population against GDR
propaganda.10 Yet like Roth and Schindelbeck, Schlomann then focuses on
the psychological warfare activities at the border between East and West Ger-
many; in particular, the use of loudspeakers and the dropping of leaºets to
undermine the morale of GDR soldiers. In this they reºect the media report-
ing on the Bundeswehr’s psychological warfare battalions at the time.11
The idea of “immunization” meant that Bonn’s psychological warfare
section was expected to look closer to home as well. The section was responsi-
ble for countering Communist subversion “from abroad and from the Ger-
man underground” that threatened to undermine the will of the West
German people to defend their country.12 By focusing on the campaign to
counter the GDR’s “Vietnam Legion” allegations, this article reveals that the
FRG’s psychological warfare experts not only targeted the enemy in the East
but also strove—covertly—to inºuence public opinion in the FRG as well as
in France, Britain, and the newly independent states in Africa and Asia. East
and West German archival records as well as British primary sources allow for
an analysis of the methods used by the psychological warfare section.
In addition to highlighting the activities of the Bundeswehr’s psychologi-
cal warfare section, the article shows how an East German “information” cam-
paign worked and what it tried to achieve. The article then demonstrates how
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7. Dirk Drews, “Die Psychologische Kampfführung/psychologische Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland—Eine erziehungswissenschaftliche und publizistikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung,”
Ph.D. diss., University of Mainz, 2006, http://ubm.opus.hbz-nrw.de/volltexte/2006/981/pdf/diss
.pdf.
8. Karl Heinz Roth et al., Invasionsziel: DDR, vom Kalten Krieg zur Neuen Ostpolitik (Hamburg:
konkret Buchverlag, 1971). The book was a special edition of the left-wing magazine konkret. One of
its columnists in the 1960s was Ulrike Meinhoff, later cofounder of the Baader-Meinhoff group.
9. Dirk Schindelbeck, “Propaganda mit Gummiballons und Pappraketen: Deutsch-deutscher Flug-
blattkrieg nach dem Bau der Mauer,” in Gerald Diesener and Rainer Gries, eds., Propaganda in Deutsch-
land: Zur Geschichte der politischen Meinungsbildung im 20. Jahrhundert (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag,
1996), pp. 213–234; and Friedrich-Wilhelm Schlomann, “Der psychologische Krieg der DDR und die
PsK der Bundeswehr,” Deutschland-Archiv, Vol. 34, No. 2 (February 2001), pp. 246–258.
10. Schlomann, “Der psychologische Krieg der DDR,” p. 252.
11. “Viel Verdruß bei Ballon-Aktion,” Die Welt, 27 July 1965, p. 4; and “Neckermann schießt auf
Luftballons,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 July 1965, p. 3. See also the earlier coverage in Der Spiegel,
No. 22/1965 (25 May 1965), pp. 47–50.
12. Minute for Drews for meeting with Minister of Defense, 10 July 1958, in BMA-F, BW2/20206.
West German authorities maintained an unofªcial network that enabled
them to publish “camouºaged propaganda” and plant articles in West Ger-
man newspapers authored by the psychological warfare section.13 By scruti-
nizing propaganda practices at the grassroots level, the analysis here expands
the post–Cold War literature regarding the use of propaganda in Western de-
mocracies during the ªrst two decades after World War II—literature that
demonstrates the importance Western leaders attached to information policy
and discusses broad themes of Western propaganda.14 Finally, taking the lead
from what Ralph Giordano has termed “perverse anti-Communism,” the arti-
cle also explores the extent to which West Germany’s counterpropaganda
campaign reºected the survival of essentially undemocratic traditions and
convictions rooted in Germany’s Nazi past.15
A point worth stressing at the outset is that documents in the West Ger-
man archives lend no credence to the “Vietnam Legion” allegations. The East
German campaign stood reality on its head. The West German Defense
Ministry’s counter-campaign has to be seen in relation to the determination
of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard’s government not to send any West German
soldiers to Vietnam. Even U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s pressure
on Erhard to do so in December 1965 did not change West German policy.
Erhard was acutely aware that opinion polls showed no support for Bundes-
wehr engagement in Vietnam. The FRG government was becoming increas-
ingly worried about the growing student movement, and Erhard was so con-
cerned about the toxic Vietnam issue that he did his best to keep secret the
U.S. request for Bundeswehr units.16
The GDR-FRG Information War
One of the major tasks and preoccupations of the West German intelligence
service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), was to monitor and assess the
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13. Often referred to as “gray propaganda,” the important point is that the messages were not attrib-
uted to the government. On this method, see Osgood, Total Cold War, pp. 76–88.
14. Like Kenneth Osgood, most scholars have focused on the United States and Britain. See, for ex-
ample, Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia:
University of Philadelphia Press, 2008); Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Informa-
tion Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989 (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009); Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2003); and Scott Lucas, Freedom’s
War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union (New York: New York University Press, 2000).
15. Ralph Giordano, Die zweite Schuld oder von der Last Deutscher zu sein (Hamburg: Rasch &
Röhring, 1987), p. 208.
16. Alexander Troche, “Berlin wird am Mekong verteidigt:” Die Ostasienpolitik der Bundesrepublik in
China, Taiwan und Südvietnam 1954–1966 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001), pp. 393–398.
situation in East Germany. In the BND’s high-level situation reports, GDR
foreign and domestic policies, as well as the intentions of SED leaders, fea-
tured prominently. Several months after the Berlin Wall was built in 1961,
the BND noted that public attacks against West Germany had risen sig-
niªcantly, particularly from abroad.17 By the mid-1960s, West German intel-
ligence believed it knew the general theme of GDR “propaganda” only too
well. The propagandists insisted that the FRG, driven by imperialist and neo-
colonialist desires, was a threat to peace worldwide.18 By demonstrating that
Bonn was essentially continuing the militarism of Nazi Germany, the GDR
hoped to drive a wedge between West Germany and its allies in Europe. The
East German regime targeted the West German public with similar argu-
ments. The GDR emphasized its own desire for peace and denounced Bonn’s
dangerous adventures abroad as “national treason.”19
The “Vietnam Legion” allegations ªt perfectly into the West German as-
sessment of GDR information strategy. Bonn’s psychological warfare experts
surmised that the GDR had launched a new campaign with four main objec-
tives: ªrst, to discredit the FRG in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa; sec-
ond, to portray the Bundeswehr as a tool of Bonn’s militaristic policies; third,
to popularize the slogan “Vietnam Legion” and thereby use General Trettner’s
connection to Hitler’s “Condor Legion” to defame not only the general him-
self but the Bundeswehr as a whole; and fourth, to convince the West German
public that the FRG was squandering the lives of Bundeswehr soldiers in the
“dirty war” in Vietnam.20
Were these West German assessments correct? Did they reºect the inten-
tions behind GDR information campaigns? The records of the SED indicate
that West German interpretations of GDR information policy were generally
accurate. However, this does not so much demonstrate the sophistication of
West German open-source intelligence analysis as it does show that GDR me-
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17. Report 118/62 (brieªng paper for visit of British prime minister to Germany), 18 January 1962,
in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PA), B 6/61.
18. Lagebericht SBZ 9–10/1965, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) Situation Report on Soviet Occu-
pation Zone, October 1965, in Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA-K), B 206/909.
19. Lagebericht SBZ 1–2/1966 (BND Situation Report on Soviet Occupation Zone), February 1966,
in BA-K, B 206/910.
20. The FRG’s policy of ensuring non-recognition of the GDR outside the Communist bloc, dubbed
the Hallstein Doctrine, came increasingly under pressure in the 1960s, particularly in newly inde-
pendent countries. Information policy and East German attacks on West German “war mongering”
and support for regimes like the one in South Africa played a crucial role. See William Glenn Gray,
Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969 (Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 149–154. East German Radio expanded its foreign language
broadcasting in the 1960s to target audiences in Africa and Asia. See Klaus Arnold, Kalter Krieg im
Äther: Der Deutschlandsender und die Westpropaganda der DDR (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2002), p. 134.
For the description of Vietnam as a “dirty war,” see “Material zur kommunistischen Propaganda Nr.
IV-13-965,” 10 September 1965, in BW/2/5112, BMA-F.
dia successfully communicated the intended—and fairly blunt—messages.
An SED memorandum outlining foreign information policy detailed the is-
sues East German media had to convey. The main aim was to “reveal” Bonn’s
aggressive policy and its role in disturbing the peace worldwide. To this end,
GDR ofªcials were supposed to “expose” West Germany’s plans for war, its
supposed eagerness to acquire nuclear weapons, and its direct support of “im-
perialist” interventions. They sought to create the impression that Bonn and
the “West German armament monopolies” were working hand in hand with
“U.S. imperialism.” The FRG was to be portrayed as a close ally of colonial
powers and racist dictatorships. In the GDR media, Bonn’s foreign economic
and military aid was portrayed as a form of “extreme support for neocolonial-
ism” that would “prevent national, independent, and democratic develop-
ment” in the Third World. GDR propaganda ofªcials argued that the Federal
Republic and Nazi Germany were of the same basic nature. One way to prove
this was to show that former Nazi leaders and war criminals occupied leading
positions in Bonn. In the view of East German strategists, exposing the Nazi
past of the FRG’s elite would reafªrm deep-rooted suspicions still prevalent
among West Germany’s neighbors and bring policy differences within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the fore, driving a wedge be-
tween Bonn and its Western allies.21 The East Germans were well aware of
how successful their previous campaigns had been in revealing the Nazi past
of high-ranking FRG politicians. These revelations and an apparent rise of
anti-Semitism in the FRG in 1959–1960 had sparked a public outcry in Brit-
ain and the United States.22
Overall, the intentions of the GDR’s foreign information policy matched
West German intelligence assessments. However, West German analysts
seemed not to understand the ideological nature of the GDR’s claims. The
voluminous records of the SED’s higher organs have an aura of sincerity about
them. Ofªcials at all levels seem to have believed in the claims made
about West Germany.23 Although GDR leaders knew they had to adhere to
the set line, more signiªcant factors were also at work. On the one hand, dero-
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21. “The development of GDR foreign information,” attachment to SED Central Committee min-
utes 43/65, 9 January 1965, in Stiftung der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im
Bundesarchiv Berlin (SAPMO-BArch), DY30/J IV 2/2/1011.
22. Ulrich Brochhagen, Nach Nürnberg: Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära
Adenauer (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1994), pp. 298–306; and Henning Hoff, Großbritannien und die
DDR 1955–1973: Diplomatie auf Umwegen (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), pp. 313–314. In
their discussion of the 1959–1960 anti-Semitism campaign, Brochhagen and Hoff mention in passing
that the FRG Auswärtiges Amt made some feeble attempts at countering GDR propaganda abroad.
23. See Peter C. Caldwell, Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social Theory in the German Democratic
Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 5–11; and Mary E. Sarotte, Dealing with
the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1968–1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2001), p. 173.
gations of the capitalist enemy as “militarist” and “imperialist” had been a key
feature of Soviet-bloc discourse for decades. Party ofªcials did not question
the truth of such statements, which ªt with their deeply held ideological pre-
conceptions. The SED Central Committee explicitly described the claims
about West German militarism as “continuing the polemical and aggressive
discussion of the imperialist ideology and policy of West German monopoly
capitalism.”24 For the SED, “truth” or “objectivity” in a positivist sense was of
secondary importance, something the West German analysts never fully ap-
preciated. Their counter-campaign focused on a fact-based approach and did
not engage with ideas or ideologies.
The Bundeswehr’s psychological warfare analysts closely monitored the
“Vietnam Legion” campaign. They noted that East German claims about al-
leged FRG involvement began in June 1965 and peaked in September of that
year, coinciding with the Federal Republic’s election campaign. This could
not have been an accident, Bonn’s psychological warfare experts concluded.25
They assumed that the GDR campaign was carefully planned and centrally
directed, most likely from Moscow.26
The GDR Campaign
Documents from the SED archives reveal that the campaign was centrally di-
rected by the party’s Commission for Agitation (Agitationskommission). How-
ever, the East German records do not indicate that the Soviet Union was or-
chestrating the campaign. The SED Commission for Agitation was headed by
Albert Norden, the chief architect of GDR information policy. The commis-
sion had twenty members overall, including the directors of GDR radio and
TV and the editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland. The day-to-day work was
coordinated by a smaller group of three members. Their task was to issue
guidelines on the most important questions of the day and to stay in close
contact with the directors of GDR television and radio and with the editor of
Neues Deutschland.27
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24. “The development of GDR foreign information,” 9 January 1965.
25. “Material zur kommunistischen Propaganda Nr. IV-13-965,” 10 September 1965.
26. Lothar Lohrisch, ed., Neue Kommunistische Verleumdungskampagne “Legion Vietnam” (Cologne:
Markus-Verlag, 1965), p. 18.
27. Attachment 6 to minute 49/65, 11 December 1965, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2/1017.
For an overview of the organization of the GDR’s Department of Agitation, see Heike Amos, Politik
und Organisation der SED-Zentrale 1949–1963: Struktur und Arbeitsweise von Politbüro, Sekretariat
und Zentralkomitee und ZK-Apparat (Münster: LIT-Verlag, 2003), pp. 368–369.
The 1960s were the heyday of the Commission for Agitation. Norden,
known for giving press conferences that denounced leading West German
politicians as former Nazis, found the body to be a useful tool. The commis-
sion’s “guidelines for argumentation” (Argumentationshinweise), despite their
innocuous name, were far more than guidelines. They were binding instruc-
tions transmitted to the editors of all major newspapers and the ofªcial ADN
news agency.28 GDR television and radio received them too. The guidelines
usually dealt with no more than three topics a day. They were not meant to be
minutely detailed blueprints for newspapers and newscasts to follow. Instead,
the guidelines focused on the issues deemed to be of greatest importance.
They also left room for some creativity on the journalists’ part to communi-
cate the message.29
This principle not only helped to guarantee apparent variety in the GDR
media but also left no doubt of the importance of the topics selected by the
commission. For example, Guideline No. 66, issued 12 June 1965, gave pri-
mary emphasis to the theme of alleged West German military involvement in
Vietnam. It asked GDR journalists to take recent coups in Saigon as a starting
point to criticize West German claims that the United States was ªghting for
“democracy” in Vietnam. Newspapers, radio, and television should discuss
West German preparations for military involvement in the Vietnam War.30
This was the ªrst time the guidelines mentioned this theme, and GDR media
heeded the commission’s advice. Those monitoring GDR media in the West
German Ministry of Defense noted that East Germany had started a new
campaign against the Bundeswehr.31
On 4 September 1965 the commission decided to step up the campaign.
The opportunity to accelerate the “Vietnam Legion” propaganda had opened
the previous day when West German Bundestag Member Oswald Adolf
Kohut of the liberal Free Democrats raised allegations of West German mili-
tary involvement in Vietnam. Kohut’s question was based on rumors and mis-
representations ªrst published by the West German Communist newspaper
Bauernruf and then picked up by Western news agencies. This led to head-
lines such as “German Foreign Legion as U.S. Pilots in Vietnam War?” in
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28. Gunter Holzweißig, Die schärfste Waffe der Partei: Eine Mediengeschichte der DDR (Cologne:
Böhlau Verlag, 2002), pp. 17–19.
29. The complete run of guidelines for 1965 can be found in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A2/9.02/
45–57. The commission also held “argumentation meetings” on Tuesdays and Thursdays. See Julia
Franziska Engels, Helden an der Mauer: Die propagandistische Aufbereitung von Republikºuchten in der
deutschen Presse (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), p. 54; and Holzweißig, Schärfste Waffe, p. 9.
30. Argumentationshinweise No. 66 by Singer, 12 June 1965, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A2/9.02/
48.
31. “Material zur kommunistischen Propaganda Nr. IV-13-965,” 10 September 1965.
mainstream West German newspapers.32 To build on this initial propaganda
success, a senior SED ofªcial, Rudi Singer, cabled all GDR media outlets on
4 September at 1:00 p.m. He asked editors to continue reporting “all facts”
about the participation of West Germans in the Vietnam War “at length and
most prominently.”33 Journalists should make use of a recent Time magazine ar-
ticle and the parliamentary question tabled by Kohut. They should allege that
Bonn was preparing to establish a “Vietnam Legion” as Hitler had done in
Spain. Reports should stress that Erhard’s government was trying to hide these
preparations from the public. GDR journalists were ordered to disclose as
much as possible to convince West German citizens not to reelect the Chris-
tian Democrats. According to GDR propagandists, the defeat of Chancellor
Erhard at the general elections on 19 September was the only way to stop his
“dangerous and adventurous policy” before it was too late.34
The instructions from the Commission for Agitation demonstrate that
the West German assessment of GDR motives was broadly correct. The SED
initiated the extended coverage in East German media of alleged Bundeswehr
participation in Vietnam in early September 1965 and strove to put the alle-
gations into the context of the West German general elections. Moreover, on
4 September 1965 the SED employed the phrase “Vietnam Legion.” West
German analysts accurately construed the East German actions as a carefully
calibrated campaign that would peak prior to the elections, but they over-
looked one important aspect: the “Vietnam Legion” campaign proved the
ºexibility of the East German propaganda machine. SED ofªcials could ex-
ploit opportunities when low-key GDR propaganda had succeeded in raising
doubts among FRG members of parliament.
It is important to note that the Commission for Agitation’s guidelines to
step up the campaign were issued after these events. The parliamentary ques-
tion and Western reports had created an opening for the GDR to seize on an
issue that had been simmering since June. The “Vietnam Legion” theme also
ªt perfectly into a general instruction issued by the Commission for Agitation
in August 1965: When discussing the West German election campaign, GDR
journalists had to “engage with” Bonn’s “policy” of endangering peace. Arti-
cles were to prove, on a daily basis, the costs the West German people would
incur if they reelected the CDU, “the party of division and preparation for
war.”35
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32. “Deutsche Fremdenlegionäre als US-Flieger im Vietnam-Krieg?” Duisburger General Anzeiger,
4 September 1965, p. 3.
33. Singer to all GDR media, 4 September 1965, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A2/9.02/49; under-
lined in original.
34. Ibid.
35. Argumentationshinweise No. 91, 27 August 1965, in SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A2/9.02/49.
GDR radio and Neues Deutschland immediately jumped on Kohut’s par-
liamentary initiative, even before the Commission for Agitation issued its
guidelines. This showed the speed and ºexibility of East Berlin as well as the
control of information policy by a small inner circle of GDR ofªcials. The ed-
itor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland, Hermann Axen, played a key role on the
Commission for Agitation.
Although West German psychological warfare experts tended to over-
estimate the long-term planning of GDR propaganda, they lacked a deeper
understanding of the motivation. The “Vietnam Legion” campaign, albeit
important, was not one of the major GDR campaigns at the time. The Com-
mission for Agitation did not issue any further guidelines on the matter in
1965. A truly high-proªle campaign would have generated many more in-
structions. An example at the time was the GDR campaign against the statute
of limitation for prosecuting Nazi war crimes in West Germany. The cam-
paign was meticulously organized, comprising not only media coverage but
also agitation in factories and demonstrations in various East German cities.36
West German analysts also failed to appreciate that both the statute of
limitations campaign and the “Vietnam Legion” campaign targeted East Ger-
man as much as West German and international audiences. The “Vietnam
Legion” campaign in particular reºected the ideological divide and views of
the main political enemy that had dominated German Communist discourse
for decades. All leading party ofªcials had fought in the Spanish Civil War
against Nazi German intervention, and the ideals and sacriªces of that war
were engrained in the German Communist mind and frequently invoked in
the GDR until well into the 1970s.37 Norden’s use of the Spanish Civil War in
his book on the “making of wars” is a case in point. He devoted the largest
part of his chapter on the origins of Word War II to a discussion of the “mur-
derers of Spain.” Later, in the section on the Vietnam War, he returned to the
Spanish Civil War theme, comparing U.S. military help for the Saigon regime
to Hitler’s support for Francisco Franco.38
Norden’s book shows how the Spanish experience was used as shorthand
for the aggressiveness of the enemies of Communism. Employing the term
“Vietnam Legion” was designed not only to vilify the Bundeswehr in West
Germany and beyond but also to resonate with ideological stalwarts in the
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GDR. The term was a battle cry that forged unity in East Germany and ex-
posed the alleged neoimperialists in West Germany.
The West German Counter-Campaign
The existing literature on the West German psychological warfare section
stresses that it sought mainly to inºuence East German hearts and minds. At
the border the section bombarded GDR soldiers with loudspeaker messages.39
Its members also used balloons to drop leaºets over the GDR.40 The messages
usually tried to undermine morale in East Germany and were designed to per-
suade soldiers and civilians to ºee to the more afºuent West. This part of
Bonn’s psychological warfare activity was publicly known, and the media duly
dubbed Christian Trentzsch, the head of the psychological warfare section,
the “balloon warrior.”41
Yet the “balloon warriors” reacted differently to the “Vietnam Legion”
campaign. They considered neither East German soldiers nor civilians on the
other side of the Iron Curtain to be possible targets for countermeasures. In-
stead, they focused squarely on West German and Western European public
opinion—a sign that the psychological warfare experts only partly understood
which audience GDR agitation targeted. Often, the West Germans found
themselves on the defensive when GDR propaganda escalated, and they did
little more than try to show that the East Germans were liars.
One of the reasons for this essentially defensive posture was that despite
the FRG’s close monitoring of the campaign from June 1965 onward, the dra-
matic turn in early September came as a surprise to the West German Minis-
try of Defense. An important omission in the ministry’s ªrst press statement
on the matter necessitated the more extensive counter-campaign over the fol-
lowing months. In response to the Bauernruf report that West Germans were
ªghting in Vietnam and the subsequent tabling of a parliamentary question,
the press ofªce issued a brief statement denying the claims and afªrming that
no Bundeswehr soldiers were militarily involved in Vietnam, nor had the
ministry granted “special leave” to Bundeswehr soldiers to go to Vietnam and
ªght there. Reports to the contrary were simply false, manufactured by
Bauernruf, a paper with close links to Communists, the statement added.42
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The statement was issued on 3 September 1965, a Friday, which might
explain why the ministry did not look more closely into the Bauernruf claims
or at the evidence quoted by the GDR propagandists; notably, the article in
Time magazine. Time, as Bauernruf and later GDR media pointed out, had
reported that 23 West Germans were ªghting in Vietnam. The West German
ministry’s press release did not mention the Time report or look into it, nor
did the Associated Press (AP) refer to it when transmitting a story to its clients
on 3 September 1965. The AP focused on the West German denial but went
on to say that the denial was a reaction to a report in a U.S. newsmagazine.43
The AP story opened the ºoodgates. West German newspapers were keen
to pursue it. “Is the Condor Legion Revived in Vietnam?” one paper asked
when noting Bonn’s denial of a report in the “generally very well-informed
American magazine Time.”44 Another paper’s lead sentence put even more
emphasis on the alleged source: “The newsmagazine Time claims that Ger-
man pilots are involved in the Vietnam War.”45 In reality, Time had never
made such a claim. A report published on 23 July 1965 mentions that
23 West German instructors and technicians were working in Vietnam, but in
noting this Time was merely reiterating a fact the West German magazine Der
Spiegel had reported two weeks earlier.46 Although West German media pub-
lished corrections a few days later, the damage had been done.47 Not only had
the GDR campaign been reinvigorated, the leadership of the Bundeswehr also
received more and more reports that its soldiers were beginning to ask prob-
ing questions. Many rank-and-ªle Bundeswehr soldiers were wondering
whether the GDR’s claims were true.48
Even as ofªcials in the psychological warfare section were trying to ex-
plain to the Bundeswehr’s command what had happened, news came in that
GDR media were about to publish additional evidence for their claims.49 Leo
Habicher of United Press International (UPI) called the ministry to alert the
Bundeswehr to the latest ADN report, which featured a supposed witness,
Private Reinhard Mankus, who had “sought refuge” in the GDR. Mankus
claimed that one of his Bundeswehr superiors had tried to lure him into com-
175
The “Vietnam Legion”
43. Vietnam Legion? A New Communist Defamation Campaign (London: Independent Information
Centre, n.d.), p. 54. An original copy of the wire report is in BMA-F, BW/2/5114.
44. “Deutsche als Fremdenlegionäre in Vietnam?” Duisburger General Anzeiger, 4 September 1965,
p. 1.
45. “Deutsche Piloten im Einsatz in Vietnam,” Neue Ruhr Neue Rhein Zeitung, 4 September 1965,
p. 3.
46. “Viet Nam & Korea: A Comparison,” Time, 23 July 1965, p. 10; and “Vietnam—23 Deutsche,”
Der Spiegel, No. 28 (7 July 1965), p. 59.
47. Associated Press, “No Vietnam Legion,” Neue Ruhr Neue Rhein Zeitung, 6 September 1965, p. 3.
48. Draft minute to minister (Ministervorlage), 14 January 1966, in BMA-F, BW/2/5112.
49. Minute for Chef Stab S, 9 September 1965, in BMA-F, BW/2/5112.
mitting to a tour in Vietnam by offering a handsome payment of 2,000
Deutschmarks a month.50
The psychological warfare section immediately went to work, probed
into Mankus’s career in the Bundeswehr, and found he had a very poor re-
cord. Mankus had joined the Bundeswehr in October 1964. He had been
ªned numerous times for insubordination, was known for poor personal hy-
giene, and had crashed the car of an ofªcer on a joyride just a month before
his desertion in August 1965. Mankus had an aunt in the GDR, and from her
correspondence with relatives in West Germany the psychological warfare sec-
tion learned that Mankus had probably been arrested in Poland.51
The Mankus story forced Bonn’s psychological warfare experts further
onto the defensive. To recapture lost ground, they provided trusted journalists
with background information, appealed directly to journalists to “act respon-
sibly,” planted material in regional newspapers, and published a booklet in
German, English, and French that detailed the errors, lies, and distortions of
the GDR’s campaign. While the psychological warfare experts did not com-
mand the same resources as the vast state-run GDR media machinery, they
counted on one important advantage. Citizens in Western countries knew
that the mass media were independent of state control. If the independent
media were to debunk the claims made in the “Vietnam Legion” campaign,
GDR propaganda was bound to fail. The independence of Western media
was thus a crucial part of this strategy.52 Ofªcial denials would never be as
powerful as an apparently independent report. The common element of the
countermeasures taken by the psychological warfare section was the require-
ment that the public had to be unaware of the Bundeswehr’s involvement.
West Germany was not the only Western democracy concealing its infor-
mation activities during the Cold War.53 When rebutting the “Vietnam Le-
gion” allegations, West German ofªcials used techniques similar to those
adopted by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the British Information
Research Department (IRD). The IRD, for example, stressed in its internal
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papers that interpretative analyses of Communist policy, including propa-
ganda and tactics, were the most important material that the department dis-
tributed. Moreover, the background information produced had to be “as fac-
tual and as accurate as we can make it.”54
Bonn’s psychological warriors followed the same principles. However,
some aspects of the FRG’s counter-campaign also reºect the darker days of
German history. The psychological warfare section employed methods that
had been used by Nazi propagandists in the 1930s; it also chose to fall back
on anti-Communist information networks and writers who had played a
prominent role in Nazi Germany.
West German Counterpropaganda Methods
The FRG’s counter-campaign sought to debunk East German propaganda
techniques. The psychological warfare analysts presented factual information
and thoroughly refuted East Germany’s allegations. In this they stuck to the
“truth” as they saw it but resorted to emotive language. The documents do
not suggest any attempts at distorting or inventing events—the content of
West German information on the alleged “Vietnam Legion” was factual and
accurate—but many of the means of disseminating the information were
questionable or outright manipulative, none more so than the psychological
warfare section’s ªrst initiative. In the wake of the escalation of the GDR’s
campaign, the section published an article in the Sunday edition of Kölnische
Rundschau, one of the major papers in Cologne, West Germany’s third-largest
city.55 Published under the byline “Rundschau on Sunday’s Own Report,” the
article afªrmed that the story of West German soldiers ªghting in Vietnam
was false.56 The authors cited the professions of the 23 West Germans Time
had mentioned as working in Vietnam. Most were teachers, social workers,
and doctors. The article seemed like any journalistic, fact-based report, but
the tone changed in the ªnal paragraph: “This [‘Vietnam Legion’] is a phan-
tom army,” the article observed. “Anything else is utter invention and distor-
tion.”57 How the psychological warfare section managed to plant the article or
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who its contacts at the newspaper were remains obscure. It probably helped
that the paper was known to be government-friendly and that its ofªces were
not far from the Ministry of Defense.58
In a second step, the FRG analysts prepared background information for
journalists. Titled “Material on Communist Propaganda,” this information
series was routinely disseminated to trusted journalists, politicians, and activ-
ists at home and abroad, and it was to be used without attribution.59 Pro-
viding “information” on Communist policies and leaving its use to the indi-
vidual journalist was common practice during the Cold War. The USIA and
IRD spread information in the same way. They shared the view that publica-
tion without acknowledging the government as a source increased the persua-
sive value of the information. An internal IRD paper explained the rationale
behind this approach:
The basic principle on which we produce this material is that for the most part it
is intended to be passed discreetly to local leaders of opinion in all spheres, polit-
ical, ofªcial, military, educational, trade union, press, religious, etc. as ammuni-
tion to help them ªght the threat of Communist subversion in their countries in
their own way. It is intended that there should be no attribution of this material
to a Mission, Her Majesty’s Government or indeed any ofªcial British source.60
Like the IRD’s material, the psychological warfare section’s “Material on
Communist Propaganda” series could succeed only if journalists cooperated.
In at least one case cooperation was forthcoming. Franz Portnersberg of the
conservative weekly newspaper Rheinischer Merkur based a full-page article on
little more than material supplied by the Ministry of Defense—and without
acknowledging the source. Portnersberg limited his journalistic contribution
to stylistic improvements to the cumbersome language the psychological war-
fare section had produced.61
Whereas the ªrst two aspects of the counter-campaign relied on the con-
nivance of journalists, the third and main pillar of the psychological warfare
section’s information campaign dispensed with the need for reporters’ and ed-
itors’ cooperation. Using a technique that had served ultranationalist press
baron Alfred Hugenberg well in spreading nationalistic propaganda in the
1920s and 1930s, the psychological warfare section managed to have provin-
cial newspapers publish a one-page special report denouncing the GDR’s
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“Vietnam Legion” campaign.62 A private company distributed the special re-
port in the form of paper pulp molds, known as matrices (Matern) in the
printing business.63 Matrices of complete newspaper pages were light, easy to
ship, and an inexpensive way for small newspapers to acquire content. Recog-
nizing the possibility of manipulation, U.S. and British forces in western
Germany after World War II had promoted newspaper licensing that would
establish only papers of sufªcient size that could survive without relying
on matrices. Licensing had come to an end in 1949, however. Subsequently,
more than 700 small provincial newspapers were established in West
Germany, and many subscribed to services that provided matrices.64
Christina von Hodenberg has convincingly argued that the West German
public sphere turned more critical in the 1960s as the political situation in the
FRG became more stable. Her work, however, is based on an analysis of
national media.65 In focusing on small regional and local newspapers, the
psychological warfare section was targeting the soft underbelly of West Ger-
man journalism. The section believed that the matrices of its special report
reached more than 5 million readers.66 Titled “‘Vietnam Legion’ or SED Lies
Have Short Legs,” the report stuck to the established line of exposing the
ºimsiness of GDR claims. Photographs were included that aimed to demon-
strate the exclusively humanitarian work of West German teachers and doc-
tors in Vietnam. Excerpts of the article in the West German Communist
newspaper Bauernruf, which had started the GDR campaign, were promi-
nently displayed, as were reproductions of the misquoted Time magazine re-
port and the Associated Press wire that had repeated the Bauernruf claims
without checking the paper’s sources.67
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The editors who received the matrices of the special report had no way of
knowing the piece originated with the Ministry of Defense. This became ap-
parent when the Bauernruf called for the newspapers that had printed the
page to publish a counterstatement—a right provided by West German press
law. Faced with this legal demand, the editors sent urgent letters to West-
Pressedienst, the press service that had distributed the matrices. The letters
show that newspaper editors did not know that West-Pressedienst was work-
ing for the Ministry of Defense. The editors asked the press service for the
name of the journalist who had written the report. They also asked to be
given more information.68 Replies on behalf of West-Pressedienst were sent by
Helmut Hermann Führing, a freelance author who lived close to Bonn.69 Be-
cause he had authored matrices promoting the cause of the Bundeswehr before,
he likely also wrote the “special report” countering the “Vietnam Legion” alle-
gations.70 In 1939, Führing had published a book on the achievements of the
“Condor Legion” in the Spanish Civil War.71 If so, the ministry was relying on
someone with a potentially controversial past. Führing wrote two more books
on military subjects after World War II, both published by a company owned
by Paul Junker, who had been a prominent publisher in Nazi Germany.72 Prior
to founding the publishing house Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag in 1927,
Junker had received a doctorate in philosophy at Greifswald University. His
thesis supervisor at Greifswald was Hermann Schwarz, who played a major
role in the ultranationalist German Philosophic Society (Deutsche Philosophische
Gesellschaft) and who joined the National Socialist German Workers’ Party
(NSDAP) before 1933.73 Among the books Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag
published in the 1930s was the ofªcial history of the SS.74
The psychological warfare section counted on a network of people with
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backgrounds similar to Führing’s in the most costly aspect of its counter-
campaign against the “Vietnam Legion” allegations: the publication and dis-
tribution of an 86-page booklet in German, English, and French. Titled Viet-
nam Legion? A New Communist Defamation Campaign in English and Legion
Viet Nam? Nouvelle campagne de propagande communiste in French, the book-
let was an extended high-gloss version of the “Material on Communist Propa-
ganda” that had been produced for trusted journalists in late September 1965.
The German edition was published as part of a series of the defense press ser-
vice Wehrpolitische Informationen. Ostensibly “neutral,” the West German
Bundespresseamt covertly funded this press service on behalf of the psycho-
logical warfare section.75 Run by Lothar Lohrisch, the service regularly sup-
plied West German newspapers with information on defense matters and oc-
casionally with booklets like Vietnam Legion? Lohrisch was known for his far-
right views. His political convictions, coupled with allegations that he had di-
verted Bonn’s covert funding to produce stridently anti-Communist publica-
tions, were more than the West German government could stomach when the
Social Democrats took ofªce and embarked on Ostpolitik. Consequently, the
ministry ended all cooperation with Lohrisch in 1970.76
For the translation and distribution of the English and French editions,
the psychological warfare section employed the services of Markus Verlag.
The ministry’s ties with this publishing house and its director, Helmut Bohn,
dated back to the 1950s. In Nazi Germany, Bohn had been senior editor
of Ruhr Arbeiter, the newspaper of the Nazi Arbeitsfront. Although Bohn
claimed in his memoirs that he began to distance himself from the Nazi re-
gime in the early 1940s, he maintained a circle of friends who belonged to the
far right of the political spectrum.77
Bohn’s contact in Britain was the Independent Information Centre (IIC),
founded and run by the Czech anti-Communist Josef Josten, who had come
to Britain in 1948. Apart from heading the IIC, Josten was the director of the
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Free Czech Information Service (FCIS). Its most important regular publica-
tion was Features and News from Behind the Iron Curtain, which consisted of a
collection of articles on the oppression of the peoples of Eastern Europe. This
publication was sent to journalists and politicians.78 The involvement of the
IIC in the West German campaign demonstrates that the Ministry of De-
fense’s use of informal networks extended beyond the FRG’s borders. Con-
versely, Bohn was on the mailing lists of the British Foreign Ofªce’s IRD,
showing that the British used similar networks of “trusted individuals” in
their work in West Germany.79 Nevertheless, although the regular biannual
UK-FRG meetings on information policy—established in 1959 and usually
attended by diplomats and ofªcials representing the IRD and the West Ger-
man Bundespresseamt—suggest some coordination of Western information
campaigns, such cooperation proved difªcult in practice.80
In the murky world of anti-Communist information activity, Western
ofªcials at times had difªculty ªnding out who was behind a campaign or
how trustworthy a privately run organization was. This became evident when
the IIC ªrst appeared on the radar of the West German Foreign Ofªce in
1961. Josten had started a campaign highlighting the inhumanity of the erec-
tion of the Berlin Wall. The Czech émigré sent small parcels to diplomats
worldwide containing a paperweight in which a piece of barbed wire was em-
bedded. This barbed wire, Josten claimed, had been used in the division of
East and West Berlin in August 1961.81 In the letter accompanying the “me-
mento,” Josten offered to provide more paperweights for a small fee. West
German embassies in numerous countries received these parcels, and diplo-
mats there sought guidance from their superiors in Bonn on how to deal with
Josten’s campaign.82 The Auswärtiges Amt, not knowing what to make of the
IIC, asked its embassy in the United Kingdom for an assessment of Josten’s
organization. The West German embassy in London needed some time—and
a reminder from Bonn—to produce a reply. Eventually the Auswärtiges Amt
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received assurance that Josten was a sincere anti-Communist and that the
London embassy had worked with him on a number of occasions. The em-
bassy even admitted that it had helped Josten with his paperweight campaign
by giving him addresses for the distribution of 600 of the paperweights. These
had been ordered by Inter Nationes, an FRG-funded publisher of material on
German culture and society that worked closely with West Germany’s Goethe
Institutes worldwide.83
However, neither the West German embassy in London nor the Aus-
wärtiges Amt in Bonn seemed to know about the involvement of yet another
West German player in the anti-Communist information game: Josten’s “au-
thentic” barbed wire had been supplied by Heinrich Bär Verlag. This publish-
ing house was heavily involved in the “propaganda war” in Berlin and was be-
hind the satirical magazine Tarantel, which made fun of the GDR.84 The West
German psychological warfare section supported the distribution of the mag-
azine in the GDR and also had made use of Heinrich Bär Verlag in an earlier
campaign countering GDR attacks against Hans Speidel, the FRG’s high-
proªle general who had become the ªrst German Commander of NATO
Land Forces Central Europe in 1957. For this earlier campaign, Heinrich Bär
Verlag published a book commissioned by the psychological warfare section
to counter GDR allegations that Speidel was behind the Nazi plot to kill the
Yugoslav king, Alexander I, in 1934.85
Bonn’s embassy in London also seemed unaware of the British Foreign
Ofªce’s more cautious assessment of Josten. The IRD decided to share only a
limited amount of its own material with the IIC and FCIS. The IRD regarded
some of Josten’s publications as useful but found that the IIC’s and FCIS’s re-
porting was “indiscriminate and wild,” following a “rabid anti-communist
line.” Moreover, the IRD doubted Josten’s discretion and therefore tended “to
keep him at arms length.”86
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For Bohn and the West German psychological warfare section, however,
two aspects made Josten’s services attractive. First, the IIC published the
booklet Vietnam Legion in its own name and thus helped disguise the book-
let’s role in the West German information campaign. Second, the center had
been active since the end of World War II and had established a long list of
contacts. Bohn told the Bundeswehr’s psychological warfare section that
Josten had sent the booklet to all major British newspapers, to prominent
journalists, and to members of the British Parliament. Josten had also asked
Bohn for an English-language article denouncing the “Vietnam Legion” cam-
paign, and Josten had distributed the article through the FCIS in January.87
The IIC also found in John B. Hynd a suitably prominent member of the
British Parliament to write the preface of the English-language version of Viet-
nam Legion.88 Hynd had been minister for occupied Germany and Austria
from 1945 to 1947 and was now chairman of the Anglo-German Parliamen-
tary Group.89 In his preface he stressed that the booklet was contributing to
“the cause of truth.” He pointed to the “sickening” blatancy of the lies told by
Communist propaganda and referred to methods used by Nazi Propaganda
Minister Josef Goebbels: “as Herr Goebbels knew so well—the most blatant
lies, repeated often enough still leave their imprint on simple minds.”90
The production and distribution of Vietnam Legion marked the peak of
Bonn’s campaign to counter the GDR’s allegations. General Trettner resigned
in August 1966 because of a dispute with West German Defense Minister
Kai-Uwe von Hassel over allowing trade union activity in Bundeswehr bar-
racks.91 Consequently, the psychological warfare section was spared having to
defend the reputation of a general with a questionable past as a Wehrmacht
ofªcer in Spain. However, the escalation of the Vietnam War presented the
West German government with a serious dilemma. In the context of the
Johnson administration’s “more ºags campaign,” Chancellor Erhard found
himself confronted with the U.S. president’s request for a West German med-
ical company and construction battalion.92 Although Erhard stressed that ex-
isting legislation meant that sending military units would be very difªcult, he
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told U.S. ofªcials that dispatching medical personnel should be possible.93
Accordingly, West Germany sent the hospital ship Helgoland, manned by Red
Cross staff, to Vietnam in 1966. The conundrum for West German informa-
tion policy was that FRG ofªcials felt they had to generate sufªcient publicity
about West German medical aid to placate the U.S. administration. At the
same time the humanitarian aspect of the Helgoland’s mission needed to be
stressed to limit Bonn’s vulnerability to left-wing and Communist-bloc at-
tacks. In informing domestic audiences about the Helgoland, the government
therefore decided to avoid talking about moral or political support for the
U.S. war effort in Vietnam and to refrain from using the phrase “ªght against
Communism.”94
This did not stop GDR politicians from calling the Helgoland a troop
transporter, nor did it stop the East German press from continuing its “Viet-
nam Legion” allegations.95 However, in the late 1960s the psychological war-
fare section only sporadically countered these claims, usually when news of
West German citizens dying while ªghting in the U.S. Army in Vietnam refu-
eled the GDR’s campaign. One prominent case at the time was that of Private
Franz Gerhard Prediger. A West German citizen who had emigrated to the
United States in 1960, Prediger had been drafted into the U.S. Army two
years later. In 1964, when he was still a German national, he became a profes-
sional soldier in the U.S. Army. His unit was sent to Vietnam in October
1965, and he was killed while on foot patrol eight months later.96
Prediger’s wife still lived in West Germany. On her request the military
funeral—including a casket draped in the U.S. ºag—was held in Mannheim.
East Germany’s main evening news Aktuelle Kamera reported the event prom-
inently.97 All the psychological warfare section could do about this was to re-
search Prediger’s biography in order to provide West German media with
proof that his joining the U.S. forces in Vietnam had nothing to do with the
Bundeswehr or the West German government.98
The GDR was always keen to point to cases like Prediger’s. The problem
for the FRG was that West Germans who decided to move to the United
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States were allowed to join the U.S. military. Moreover, under U.S. law immi-
grants could be drafted into the U.S. Army and sent to Vietnam, even if they
were still foreign nationals. Immigrants could avoid the draft only by chang-
ing their visa status, which in turn prevented them from ever gaining U.S. cit-
izenship. Consequently, several West German citizens who had emigrated to
the United States did end up ªghting and dying in Vietnam. Confronted with
probing questions in the Bundestag, the West German government stressed
that the decision to move to the United States and join the U.S. Army was
taken by individuals.99 The West German Foreign Ofªce did its best to im-
prove the information leaºets handed to West Germans who wanted to emi-
grate to the United States, pointing out that young men ages eighteen-and-a-
half to 26 who held an immigrant visa could be drafted.100
Conclusion
The psychological warfare section of West Germany’s Ministry of Defense did
not limit its activities to the enemy in the East. The “Vietnam Legion” coun-
ter-campaign demonstrates that the section attempted to inºuence West
German as well as West European public opinion. The counter-campaign
also shows that the psychological warfare unit focused on immediate military
concerns, particularly the reputation of the Bundeswehr and its generals.
Ofªcials in the section seemed to enjoy a great deal of latitude and independ-
ence.101 Coordination between this unit and other West German government
branches dealing with “information,” mainly the Bundespresseamt and the
foreign ministry, was at times difªcult, not least because of the methods em-
ployed.
These methods mirrored those preferred by the British IRD and by
USIA, which relied on “camouºaged propaganda.” The West German psy-
chological warfare unit provided background information to journalists of in-
dependent news media and also used private publishers to counter the GDR’s
“Vietnam Legion” campaign—but with one important difference. In 1962
the Spiegel affair had shown the emergence of an increasingly critical West
German journalistic sphere that ªercely resisted government restrictions of
media freedom.102 Targeting high-proªle national media was not an option
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for the psychological warfare section. Instead, the section struck at the soft
underbelly of the West German press and focused on regional newspapers.
Resorting to methods used by Nazi and ultranationalist propagandists in Ger-
many in the 1920s and 1930s, the section produced matrices that were dis-
tributed by seemingly independent press services to local newspapers. In using
this and similar covert methods, the section relied on a network of people
who had played a questionable role in Nazi Germany. Some, like Bohn, had
occupied important positions in Nazi newspapers. Bohn claimed to have dis-
tanced himself from Nazism well before the end of World War II. Yet he, like
many others, including Bundeswehr generals who had fought in the
Wehrmacht, remained steadfast anti-Communists who were keen to continue
the struggle against the Soviet Union. West Germany provided them with a
platform to pursue their ªght against Communism, and they seized the op-
portunity.103 This led to one curious yet vital aspect of the “Vietnam Legion”
counter-campaign: the defense of General Trettner against GDR attacks that
focused on his past in Nazi Germany.
East Germany’s propagandists certainly knew how to embarrass the FRG.
The GDR’s emphasis on the Nazi past of many prominent West German
ofªcials continued to create problems for the West Germans not only abroad
but in the student movement closer to home. Young West Germans de-
manded to know exactly what their parents and grandparents had done in the
1930s and during the war. Similarly, the escalation of the Vietnam War posed
serious challenges for U.S. allies. For FRG diplomats, escalation made the de-
fense of the Hallstein Doctrine more difªcult. As dozens of countries in Africa
and Asia gained independence, the GDR tried to undermine the FRG’s posi-
tion by stressing West Germany’s alliance with the United States and its “neo-
imperial” wars. The prospect of West German economic aid usually proved
the better argument, but Bonn’s policy of breaking relations with any state
that recognized the GDR became increasingly problematic.
Not only did GDR propagandists know how to embarrass West Ger-
many; they also showed themselves effective in acting. The “Vietnam Legion”
campaign demonstrated that, despite the vast and strictly controlled propa-
ganda/media apparatus in East Germany, its information policy could be
ºexible and swift to exploit opportunities. Weak spots, such as the poorly re-
searched initial West German press release that denied the existence of a
“Vietnam Legion,” were quickly seized on by East Berlin. West German me-
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dia were also closely monitored, allowing the GDR to make the most of re-
ports about West German citizens ªghting and dying in Vietnam.
How effective was West Germany’s campaign to counter the “Vietnam
Legion” allegations? How was it received in the FRG and abroad? The psy-
chological warfare section in the West German Ministry of Defense did not
address this difªcult and possibly unanswerable question. The section’s focus
was on gathering evidence to demonstrate that East German claims were un-
founded. Yet the psychological warfare experts could not stop the GDR from
repeating the allegations. They could not stop West German newspapers from
reporting them either, particularly the allegations that FRG nationals ªghting
in U.S. uniforms had been killed in Vietnam. These false claims might have
contributed to the increasing disaffection with the U.S. war in Vietnam. The
growing student protest movement, particularly in West Berlin, regarded
Vietnam as a pivotal issue that united disparate student groups.104 Without
necessarily invoking the “Vietnam Legion” slogan, left-leaning activists and
students compared U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia with Nazi Germany’s
war in Spain. In 1968, a group of West German intellectuals and writers
signed a declaration in Berlin declaring that “Vietnam is our generation’s
Spain.”105
The West German psychological warfare section failed to appreciate one
important aspect of the “Vietnam Legion” campaign: its appeal to the East
German audience and the Communist party faithful. This audience could
not be affected by a counter-campaign that focused on convincing West Ger-
mans and the FRG’s NATO allies that East Germany’s allegations were pa-
tently false. Even today, a quarter of a century after the demise of the GDR,
the “Vietnam Legion” myth is still perpetuated in publications of the German
Communist Party (DKP) and its afªliates. These publications, such as the
weekly magazine Unsere Zeit, repeat the allegations made in the 1960s and
cite GDR sources as evidence. The author of most of the publications is
Gerhard Feldbauer, who was Vietnam correspondent for the GDR’s ADN
wire service from 1967 to 1970.106 But the phenomenon is not limited to just
the hardline holdovers. Young Germans on the far left are also willing to re-
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peat the “Vietnam Legion” story in magazines like Unsere Zeit.107 Neither the
psychological warfare section’s counter-campaign in the 1960s nor the dis-
mantling of the Berlin Wall has prevented the seeds sown by GDR propagan-
dists in 1965 from occasionally producing saplings, no matter how small and
marginal.
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